feat(sandbox): load system CA certificates for upstream TLS connections

architecture/gateway-security.md

@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ The sandbox proxy automatically detects and terminates TLS on outbound HTTPS con
 1. **Ephemeral sandbox CA**: a per-sandbox CA (`CN=OpenShell Sandbox CA, O=OpenShell`) is generated at sandbox startup. This CA is completely independent of the cluster mTLS CA.
 2. **Trust injection**: the sandbox CA is written to the sandbox filesystem and injected via `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` and `SSL_CERT_FILE` so processes inside the sandbox trust it.
 3. **Dynamic leaf certs**: for each target hostname, the proxy generates and caches a leaf certificate signed by the sandbox CA (up to 256 entries).
-4. **Upstream verification**: the proxy verifies upstream server certificates against Mozilla root CAs (`webpki-roots`), not against the cluster CA.
+4. **Upstream verification**: the proxy verifies upstream server certificates against Mozilla root CAs (`webpki-roots`) and system CA certificates from the container's trust store, not against the cluster CA. Custom sandbox images can add corporate/internal CAs via `update-ca-certificates`.
 
 This capability is orthogonal to gateway mTLS -- it operates only on sandbox-to-internet traffic and uses entirely separate key material. See [Policy Language](security-policy.md) for configuration details.
 

architecture/sandbox.md

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ flowchart TD
    - Generate ephemeral CA via `SandboxCa::generate()` using `rcgen`
    - Write CA cert PEM and combined bundle (system CAs + sandbox CA) to `/etc/openshell-tls/`
    - Add the TLS directory to `policy.filesystem.read_only` so Landlock allows the child to read it
-   - Build upstream `ClientConfig` with Mozilla root CAs via `webpki_roots`
+   - Build upstream `ClientConfig` with Mozilla root CAs (`webpki_roots`) plus system CA certificates from the container's trust store (e.g. corporate CAs added via `update-ca-certificates`)
    - Create `Arc<ProxyTlsState>` wrapping a `CertCache` and the upstream config
 
 6. **Network namespace** (Linux, proxy mode only):
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ TLS termination is automatic. The proxy peeks the first bytes of every CONNECT t
 
 **Connection flow (when TLS is detected):**
 1. `tls_terminate_client()`: Accept TLS from the sandboxed client using a `ServerConfig` with the hostname-specific leaf cert. ALPN: `http/1.1`.
-2. `tls_connect_upstream()`: Connect TLS to the real upstream using a `ClientConfig` with Mozilla root CAs (`webpki_roots`). ALPN: `http/1.1`.
+2. `tls_connect_upstream()`: Connect TLS to the real upstream using a `ClientConfig` with Mozilla root CAs (`webpki_roots`) and system CA certificates. ALPN: `http/1.1`.
 3. Proxy now holds plaintext on both sides. If L7 config is present, runs `relay_with_inspection()`. Otherwise, runs `relay_passthrough_with_credentials()` for credential injection without L7 evaluation.
 
 System CA bundles are searched at well-known paths: `/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt` (Debian/Ubuntu), `/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt` (RHEL), `/etc/ssl/ca-bundle.pem` (openSUSE), `/etc/ssl/cert.pem` (Alpine/macOS).

crates/openshell-sandbox/src/l7/tls.rs

@@ -197,11 +197,28 @@ pub async fn tls_connect_upstream(
     Ok(tls_stream)
 }
 
-/// Build a rustls `ClientConfig` with Mozilla root CAs for upstream connections.
-pub fn build_upstream_client_config() -> Arc<ClientConfig> {
+/// Build a rustls `ClientConfig` with Mozilla + system root CAs for upstream connections.
+///
+/// `system_ca_bundle` is the pre-read PEM contents of the system CA bundle
+/// (from [`read_system_ca_bundle`]). Pass the same string to [`write_ca_files`]
+/// to avoid reading the bundle from disk twice.
+pub fn build_upstream_client_config(system_ca_bundle: &str) -> Arc<ClientConfig> {
     let mut root_store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
     root_store.extend(webpki_roots::TLS_SERVER_ROOTS.iter().cloned());
 
+    // System bundles typically overlap with webpki-roots (Mozilla roots);
+    // duplicates are harmless and ensure we also pick up any custom/corporate CAs.
+    let (added, ignored) = load_pem_certs_into_store(&mut root_store, system_ca_bundle);
+    if added > 0 {
+        tracing::debug!(added, "Loaded system CA certificates for upstream TLS");
+    }
+    if ignored > 0 {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            ignored,
+            "Some system CA certificates could not be parsed and were ignored"
+        );
+    }
+
     let mut config = ClientConfig::builder()
         .with_root_certificates(root_store)
         .with_no_client_auth();
@@ -216,15 +233,23 @@ pub fn build_upstream_client_config() -> Arc<ClientConfig> {
 /// 1. Standalone CA cert PEM (for `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` which is additive)
 /// 2. Combined bundle: system CAs + sandbox CA (for `SSL_CERT_FILE` which replaces default)
 ///
+/// `system_ca_bundle` is the pre-read PEM contents of the system CA bundle
+/// (from [`read_system_ca_bundle`]). Pass the same string to
+/// [`build_upstream_client_config`] to avoid reading the bundle from disk twice.
+///
 /// Returns `(ca_cert_path, combined_bundle_path)`.
-pub fn write_ca_files(ca: &SandboxCa, output_dir: &Path) -> Result<(PathBuf, PathBuf)> {
+pub fn write_ca_files(
+    ca: &SandboxCa,
+    output_dir: &Path,
+    system_ca_bundle: &str,
+) -> Result<(PathBuf, PathBuf)> {
     std::fs::create_dir_all(output_dir).into_diagnostic()?;
 
     let ca_cert_path = output_dir.join("openshell-ca.pem");
     std::fs::write(&ca_cert_path, ca.cert_pem()).into_diagnostic()?;
 
-    // Read system CA bundle and append our CA
-    let mut combined = read_system_ca_bundle();
+    // Combine system CAs with our sandbox CA
+    let mut combined = system_ca_bundle.to_string();
     if !combined.is_empty() && !combined.ends_with('\n') {
         combined.push('\n');
     }
@@ -236,8 +261,36 @@ pub fn write_ca_files(ca: &SandboxCa, output_dir: &Path) -> Result<(PathBuf, Pat
     Ok((ca_cert_path, combined_path))
 }
 
+/// Load PEM-encoded certificates from a string into a root certificate store.
+///
+/// Returns `(added, ignored)` counts. Invalid or unparseable certificates
+/// are silently ignored, matching the behavior of
+/// `RootCertStore::add_parsable_certificates`.
+fn load_pem_certs_into_store(
+    root_store: &mut rustls::RootCertStore,
+    pem_data: &str,
+) -> (usize, usize) {
+    if pem_data.is_empty() {
+        return (0, 0);
+    }
+    let mut reader = BufReader::new(pem_data.as_bytes());
+    // Collect all results so we can count PEM blocks that fail base64
+    // decoding — rustls_pemfile::certs silently drops those, so without
+    // this they wouldn't be reflected in the `ignored` count.
+    let all_results: Vec<_> = rustls_pemfile::certs(&mut reader).collect();
+    let pem_errors = all_results.iter().filter(|r| r.is_err()).count();
+    let certs: Vec<CertificateDer<'static>> =
+        all_results.into_iter().filter_map(Result::ok).collect();
+    let (added, ignored) = root_store.add_parsable_certificates(certs);
+    (added, ignored + pem_errors)
+}
+
 /// Read the system CA bundle from well-known paths.
-fn read_system_ca_bundle() -> String {
+///
+/// Returns the PEM contents of the first non-empty bundle found, or an empty
+/// string if none of the well-known paths exist. Call once and pass the result
+/// to both [`write_ca_files`] and [`build_upstream_client_config`].
+pub fn read_system_ca_bundle() -> String {
     for path in SYSTEM_CA_PATHS {
         if let Ok(contents) = std::fs::read_to_string(path)
             && !contents.is_empty()
@@ -373,7 +426,97 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn upstream_config_alpn() {
         let _ = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
-        let config = build_upstream_client_config();
+        let config = build_upstream_client_config("");
         assert_eq!(config.alpn_protocols, vec![b"http/1.1".to_vec()]);
     }
+
+    /// Helper: generate a self-signed CA and return its PEM string.
+    fn generate_ca_pem() -> String {
+        SandboxCa::generate().unwrap().ca_cert_pem
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_pem_certs_single_ca() {
+        let pem = generate_ca_pem();
+        let mut store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
+        let (added, ignored) = load_pem_certs_into_store(&mut store, &pem);
+        assert_eq!(added, 1);
+        assert_eq!(ignored, 0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_pem_certs_multiple_cas() {
+        let bundle = format!(
+            "{}\n{}\n{}\n",
+            generate_ca_pem(),
+            generate_ca_pem(),
+            generate_ca_pem()
+        );
+        let mut store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
+        let (added, ignored) = load_pem_certs_into_store(&mut store, &bundle);
+        assert_eq!(added, 3);
+        assert_eq!(ignored, 0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_pem_certs_empty_string() {
+        let mut store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
+        let (added, ignored) = load_pem_certs_into_store(&mut store, "");
+        assert_eq!(added, 0);
+        assert_eq!(ignored, 0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_pem_certs_garbage_input() {
+        let mut store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
+        let (added, ignored) = load_pem_certs_into_store(&mut store, "this is not PEM data at all");
+        assert_eq!(added, 0);
+        assert_eq!(ignored, 0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_pem_certs_malformed_pem_block() {
+        let malformed = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nNOTBASE64!!!\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+        let mut store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
+        let (added, ignored) = load_pem_certs_into_store(&mut store, malformed);
+        assert_eq!(added, 0);
+        assert_eq!(ignored, 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_pem_certs_mixed_valid_and_invalid() {
+        let malformed = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nNOTBASE64!!!\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+        let bundle = format!(
+            "{}\n{}{}\n",
+            generate_ca_pem(),
+            malformed,
+            generate_ca_pem()
+        );
+        let mut store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
+        let (added, ignored) = load_pem_certs_into_store(&mut store, &bundle);
+        assert_eq!(added, 2);
+        assert_eq!(ignored, 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn write_ca_files_includes_sandbox_ca() {
+        let ca = SandboxCa::generate().unwrap();
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let (ca_path, bundle_path) = write_ca_files(&ca, dir.path(), "").unwrap();
+
+        // Standalone CA cert file should exist and be valid PEM
+        let ca_pem = std::fs::read_to_string(&ca_path).unwrap();
+        assert!(ca_pem.starts_with("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"));
+
+        // Combined bundle should contain at least the sandbox CA
+        let bundle_pem = std::fs::read_to_string(&bundle_path).unwrap();
+        assert!(bundle_pem.contains(ca.cert_pem()));
+
+        // Bundle should be parseable as PEM certificates
+        let mut reader = BufReader::new(bundle_pem.as_bytes());
+        assert!(
+            rustls_pemfile::certs(&mut reader).any(|r| r.is_ok()),
+            "bundle should contain at least one cert",
+        );
+    }
 }

crates/openshell-sandbox/src/lib.rs

@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ pub(crate) fn ocsf_ctx() -> &'static SandboxContext {
 
 use crate::identity::BinaryIdentityCache;
 use crate::l7::tls::{
-    CertCache, ProxyTlsState, SandboxCa, build_upstream_client_config, write_ca_files,
+    CertCache, ProxyTlsState, SandboxCa, build_upstream_client_config, read_system_ca_bundle,
+    write_ca_files,
 };
 use crate::opa::OpaEngine;
 use crate::policy::{NetworkMode, NetworkPolicy, ProxyPolicy, SandboxPolicy};
@@ -315,13 +316,14 @@ pub async fn run_sandbox(
         match SandboxCa::generate() {
             Ok(ca) => {
                 let tls_dir = std::path::Path::new("/etc/openshell-tls");
-                match write_ca_files(&ca, tls_dir) {
+                let system_ca_bundle = read_system_ca_bundle();
+                match write_ca_files(&ca, tls_dir, &system_ca_bundle) {
                     Ok(paths) => {
                         // /etc/openshell-tls is subsumed by the /etc baseline
                         // path injected by enrich_*_baseline_paths(), so no
                         // explicit Landlock entry is needed here.
 
-                        let upstream_config = build_upstream_client_config();
+                        let upstream_config = build_upstream_client_config(&system_ca_bundle);
                         let cert_cache = CertCache::new(ca);
                         let state = Arc::new(ProxyTlsState::new(cert_cache, upstream_config));
                         ocsf_emit!(